wfjag says:

No right under any provision of the Constitution is considered absolute. All are limited by other provisions. The leading case on “hate speech” not being protected by the First Amendment is Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 – 360 (2003), where in the Court stated:

“The protections afforded by the First Amendment, however, are not absolute, and we have long recognized that the government may regulate certain categories of expression consistent with the Constitution. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–572 (1942) (“There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which has never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem”). The First Amendment permits “restrictions upon the content of speech in a few limited areas, which are ‘of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be devived from them is clearly outweighted by the social interest in order and morality.’” R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, supra, at 382 – 383 (quoting Chapinsky v. New Hampshire, supra, 572).

Thus, for example, a State may punish those words “which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.” . . . Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, supra, at 572,; see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, supra, at 383 (listing limited areas where the First Amendment permits restrictions on the content of speech). We have consequently held that fighting words—“those personally abusive epithets which, when addressed to the ordinary citizen, are, as a matter of common knowledge, inherently likely to provoke violent reaction”—are generally proscribable under the First Amendment. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20, (1971); see also Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, supra, at 572. Furthermore, “the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.” Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam). And the First Amendment also permits a State to ban a “true threat.” Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708, (1969) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord, R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, supra, at 388 (“[T]hreats of violence are outside of the First Amendment”); Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 774, (1994); Schenck v. Pro–Choice Network of Western N. Y., 519 U.S. 357, 373, (1997).

“True threats” encompass those statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals. See Watts v. United States, supra, at 708, (“political hyberbole” is not a true threat); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, supra, at 388. The speaker need not actually intend to carry out the threat. Rather, a prohibition on true threats “protect[s] individuals from fear of violence” “and “from the disruption that fear engenders,” in addition to protecting people “from the possibility that the threatened violence will occur.” Ibid. Intimidation in the constitutionally proscribable sense of the word is a type of true threat, where a speaker directs a threat to a person or group of persons with the intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or death.
Respondents do not contest that some cross burnings fit within this meaning of intimidating speech, and rightly so. As noted in Part II, supra, the history of cross burning in this country shows that cross burning is often intimidating, intended to create a pervasive fear in victims that they are a target of violence.”

Plurality opinion by Justice O’Conner, in which The Chief Justice, and Justices Stevens, and Breyer joined. In a separate opinion, Justices Scalia and Thomas, also agreed with this. Still, Justice Souter dissented, and was joined by Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg, who would not have allowed even this exception to the First Amendment’s prohibition on regulation of content.

The most recent case involving national security concerns and the protections of the First Amendment, is Clapper v. Amnesty Intern. USA, ___ U.S. __, 133 S.Ct. 1138 (Feb. 26, 2013). There the Supreme Court avoided deciding whether national security can justify infringing on First Amendment rights, and so recognizing an exception to the First Amendment’s prohibitions. Plaintiffs asserted that surveillance authorized by Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), 50 U.S.C. §1881a, chilled their exercise of First Amendment rights. The majority of the Supreme Court held that plaintiffs lacked standing because they could not prove they had suffered no particularized injury [ironically, such proof would be in the possession of the NSA, DoJ and FISA court] and so plaintiffs cannot manufacture standing merely by inflicting harm on themselves based on their fears of hypothetical future harm that is not certainly impending.

Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, dissented. However, the reasons included concluding that with court authorization consistent with Fourth Amendment standards, such surveillance was proper.

So, while perhaps it is technically true that there is no national security exception to the First Amendment currently recognized by the Supreme Court, the avenues for enforcing one’s First Amendment rights under such circumstances are very limited.

Although my summary of First Amendment rights was limited by the inaccuracy of any summary, my points are valid.

Jennifer says:

ALman,
But we always appreciate “seeing you” in our virtual tavern. After all, you are a classy gent! (tips libation towards screen) here is to you!